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Abstract. We discuss the rationality of burning money behavior from a new 
perspective: the mixed Nash equilibrium. We support our argument analyzing the first-
order derivatives of the mixed equilibrium expected utility of the players with respect to 
their own utility payoffs in a 2x2 normal form game. We establish necessary and 
sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of negative derivatives. In particular, 
games with negative derivatives are the ones that create incentives for burning money 
behavior since such behavior in these games improves the player’s mixed equilibrium 
expected utility. We show that a negative derivative for the mixed equilibrium expected 
utility of a given player i occurs if, and only if, he has a strict preference for one of the 
strategies of the other player. Moreover, negative derivatives always occur when they 
are taken with respect to player i’s highest and lowest game utility payoffs.  
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1. Introduction 
Based on the concept of forward induction proposed by Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1986) and, especially, the idea of iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, 
Van Damme (1989) and Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) studied the effects of burning 
utility as a way to signal future actions. First, the authors analyzed the Battle of the 
Sexes game in which player 1 had the opportunity, before the beginning of the game, to 
signal player 2 his ability to burn utility. The Battle of the Sexes game is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 Player 1 
Player 2 
 W Z 
X (3, 1) (0, 0) 
Y (0, 0) (1, 3) 
Figure 1 
 
The game in Figure 1 has three equilibria, two in pure strategies, (X, W) and    
(Y, Z), and one in mixed strategy E=(M, N), where M = (¾, ¼)1 and N = (¼, ¾). Now, 
consider that player 1 can burn one utility unit before the Battle of the Sexes game 
starts. The normal form representation of the new game is shown in Figure 2. In this 
game, B indicates that player 1 burned utility and NB indicates that he did not burn. 
Moreover, the second letter, X or Y, indicates the strategy chosen by him after deciding 
whether to burn utility or not. In turn, for player 2, the first letter indicates the chosen 
strategy if player 1 burns utility and the second letter indicates the chosen strategy if 
player 1 does not burn utility. 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 WW WZ ZW ZZ 
BX (2, 1) (2, 1) (-1, 0) (-1, 0) 
BY (-1, 0) (-1, 0) (0, 3) (0, 3) 
NBX (3, 1) (0, 0) (3, 1) (0, 0) 
NBY (0, 0) (1, 3) (0, 0) (1, 3) 
Figure 2 
 
Based on the new game, and supported by the principle of iterative elimination 
of weakly dominated strategies, it is easy to see that the only remaining equilibrium will 
be (NBX, WW), i.e., player 1 will not burn utility and will choose strategy X, while 
player 2 will choose strategy W no matter what player 1 does. Thus, the opportunity to 
burn utility allows player 1 to achieve his preferred equilibrium point in the game. Ben-
Porath and Dekel (1992) generalized this result reaching the follow conclusion: in 
games in which a player has a strict preference for a equilibrium point, and if this player 
can self-sacrifice (burning utility), then, based on the forward induction rationality and 
iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies, such player will achieve his (or 
                                                        
1
 We denote the mixed strategy for player 1 that chooses X with probability p and Y with probability 1-p, 
by (p, 1-p).  
her) most preferred outcome.2 This conclusion was supported by Huck and Müller 
(2005) in an experimental study3. 
However, Myerson (1991, p.194-195) argues that in the context of sequential 
equilibrium, player 1’s act of burning utility can be interpreted by player 2 as irrational 
or as an error and, for this reason, should not be considered in the prediction of player 
1’s future behavior. Another argument against the conclusions of Ben-Porath and Dekel 
is inspired on Luce and Raiffa (1989). These authors argue that any effort of 
communication between the players before the beginning of the game may change the 
utility payoff matrix, i.e., can lead individuals to play a different game in the future. In 
the game context, the option to burn money for player 1 can be seen as a threat by 
player 2 and, consequently, could change player 2’s mood. Moreover, this change of 
mood could also change the utility payoffs of the game and, possibly, its equilibrium 
points. 
In addition, Van Damme (1989) and Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) recognize 
that if all players can signal their intentions by burning utility then the final outcome of 
the game may be inefficient. To confirm this idea, observe the games in Figures 3 and 4 
that were proposed by Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992). On the first, we have a stag-hunt 
game. 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 W Z 
X (9, 9) (0, 7) 
Y (7, 0) (6, 6) 
Figure 3 
 
Now suppose that both players can signal their future intentions by burning 1.5 
units of utility and after that, they started to play the stag-hunt game. The result of this 
new game is presented in Figure 4. 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 BWW BWZ BZW BZZ NBWW NBWZ NBZW NBZZ 
BXX (7.5, 7.5) (7.5, 7.5) (-1.5, 5.5) (-1.5, 5.5) (7.5, 9) (7.5, 9) (-1.5, 7) (-1.5, 7) 
BXY (7.5, 7.5) (7.5, 7.5) (-1.5, 5.5) (-1.5, 5.5) (5.5, 0) (5.5, 0) (4.5, 6) (4.5, 6) 
BYX (5.5, -1.5) (5.5, -1.5) (4.5, 4.5) (4.5, 4.5) (7.5, 9) (7.5, 9) (-1.5, 7) (-1.5, 7) 
BYY (5.5, -1.5) (5.5, -1.5) (4.5, 4.5) (4.5, 4.5) (5.5, 0) (5.5, 0) (4.5, 6) (4.5, 6) 
NBXX (9, 7.5) (0, 5.5) (9, 7.5) (0, 5.5) (9, 9) (0, 7) (9, 9) (0, 7) 
NBXY (9, 7.5) (0, 5.5) (9, 7.5) (0, 5.5) (7, 0) (6, 6) (7, 0) (6, 6) 
NBYX (7, -1.5) (6, 4.5) (7, -1.5) (6, 4.5) (9, 9) (0, 7) (9, 9) (0, 7) 
NBYY (7, -1.5) (6, 4.5) (7, -1.5) (6, 4.5) (7, 0) (6, 6) (7, 0) (6, 6) 
Figure 4 
 
Note that by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies only the 
strategies BYY and BZZ can be eliminated. Thus, if both players had the opportunity to 
burn utility at the same time, the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies 
does not lead them to an efficient equilibrium. Furthermore, the authors emphasize that 
the order in which the players can burn utility also define their power on the game, since 
the last one always has the opportunity to make a counter-signal that makes the early 
signal invalid. For this reason, the last player to signal has the greater advantage. 
                                                        
2
 For more information about burning money games and about forward induction rationality, we 
recommend: Gersbach (2004), Shimoji (2002), Stalnaker (1998) and Hammond (1993). 
3
 For other experimental results, we also recommend Brandts and Holt (1995).  
Burning money games can also be seen in another approach, which involves 
burning utility just for some specific strategy profiles, as discussed in Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1991, p.9). The authors propose the game presented in Figure 5. In this game, 
there is a unique (and inefficient) pure equilibrium (X, W). 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 W Z 
X (1, 3) (4, 1) 
Y (0, 2) (3, 4) 
Figure 5 
 
But suppose that player 1 can show for player 2 that the strategy X is not 
strongly dominant for him, i.e., suppose that player 1 sign a contract that will force him 
to burn two units of utility if he chooses the strategy X. So, the new game is shown in 
Figure 6. In this game, there is also a unique pure equilibrium point (Y, Z), but now this 
equilibrium is efficient. 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 W Z 
X (-1, 3) (2, 1) 
Y (0, 2) (3, 4) 
Figure 6 
 
Based on the exposed examples, a burning money behavior may be an important 
mechanism of cooperation, and also allow players to achieve efficient outcomes. 
Moreover, once we assume that players are capable to self-sacrifice (it is easier to 
suppose that players can reduce their own payoff than that they can increase it) it is 
natural to assume that if the same penalty is imposed by an external and impartial agent, 
the same result will emerge. For example, Laffont and Martimort (2002) affirm that a 
basic hypothesis of a principal-agent model is the existence of an external and impartial 
mediator who can monitor and punish any part that violets the contract.  Therefore, 
burning money behavior can be applied in more general economics contexts.  
In this paper, we discuss the rationality of burning money games from a new 
perspective: the mixed Nash equilibrium. We establish necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence of negative and non-positive derivatives of the mixed 
equilibrium expected utility of a given player i with respect to his (or her) own payoffs. 
In particular, games in which negative derivatives occur are the ones that create 
incentives for burning utility behavior since such behavior would improve player i’s 
mixed equilibrium expected utility. We show that a negative derivative of the mixed 
equilibrium expected utility of a given player i occurs if, and only if, he has a strict 
preference for one of the strategies of the other player, in such a case, as defined in 
Souza and Rêgo (2010), we say that player j has a strongly (or strictly) collaboratively 
dominant strategy for player i. Moreover, negative derivatives always occur with 
respect to player i’s highest and lowest game utility payoffs. We also evaluate how 
player j reacts to the act of burning money made by player i, i.e., how j´s  mixed 
equilibrium strategy varies given a change in player i´s utility payoffs. We show that if 
the derivative of the mixed equilibrium expected payoff of player i taken with respect to 
a given utility payoff of player i, say a, is negative, then if  player i burns utility with 
respect to a, i.e., reduces a, he is inducing player j to choose more often the strategy that 
is strongly collaboratively dominant for him, player i. This fact allows player i to 
achieve a more desired result. Therefore, player i should burn utility with respect to the 
payoff that makes player j converge faster to the strategy that is strongly collaboratively 
dominant for him. We also point out the difficulties of extending the proposed analysis 
for more general games, especially regarding of how players will react to burning utility 
behavior of the other players. Finally, we present an example of how our results can be 
used to evaluate the cooperation between players, reviewing some conclusions about the 
security dilemma obtained by Jervis (1978). 
For this purpose, the remaining of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 
2, we analyze the first-order derivative of the mixed equilibrium expected utility of a 
given player in a 2x2 normal form game with respect to his (or her) own utility payoffs; 
in Section 3, we discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee the 
existence of negative derivatives of mixed equilibrium expected utility (or at least non-
positive) which would justify the burning utility behavior; in Section 4, we study the 
problem of finding the best burning utility strategy. In Section 5, we discuss the 
difficulties that prevent the extension of our conclusions to a more general class of 
games; and in Section 6, to illustrate some of the applications of our results, we analyze 
the security dilemma in light of our conclusions about burning money behavior in 2x2 
games. Finally, the conclusions are presented in Section 7. 
 
 
2. The analysis of first-order derivatives 
We start considering the general structure of a 2x2 game in normal form, as 
shown in Figure 7. 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 W Z 
X (a, e) (b, f) 
Y (c, g) (d, h) 
Figure 7 
 
Let p be the probability of player 1 choosing pure strategy X and 1-p the 
probability of choosing pure strategy Y. Similarly, let q be the probability of player 2 
choosing pure strategy W and 1-q the probability of choosing pure strategy Z. We want 
to restrict our attention to the case where there is only one mixed equilibrium in the 
non-degenerated sense (no restriction is made on the number of pure equilibrium). In 
this case, it is well-known that the mixed equilibrium strategies are given by: 
 
 = ℎ −  −  −  + ℎ    (2.1) and  =
 − 
 −  −  +      (2.2) 
 
Thus, we can write the expected utility of the players in the mixed Nash 
equilibrium as a function of the utilities payoffs of each player, as follows: 
 
 =  −  −  −  +  
(2.3) 
 
 = ℎ −  −  −  + ℎ (2.4) 
Once the mixed equilibrium expected utilities are written only in terms of each 
player own utility payoff, we can study the variation of the mixed equilibrium expected 
utility with respect to changes in a given utility payoff through a first-order derivative 
analysis. Furthermore, we restrict our attention to changes in payoffs that do not change 
the general order of the player’s preferences to maintain the same strategic situation. By 
general order of the payoffs we mean: if u>v, then, after a change in payoffs, it should 
not happen that v>u and if u=v, then this relationship must be maintained after the 
changes. Thus, for player 1 we have: 
 
 =
( − )( − )
( −  −  + ) (2.5) 
 =
( − )( − )
( −  −  + ) (2.6) 
 =
( − )( − )
( −  −  + ) (2.7) 
 =
( − )( − )
( −  −  + ) (2.8) 
 =
 =
 =
ℎ = 0 
 
On the other hand, for player 2 we have: 
 
 =
( − ℎ)( − ℎ)
( −  −  + ℎ) (2.9) 
 =
( − ℎ)( − )
( −  −  + ℎ) (2.10) 
 =
( − )( − ℎ)
( −  −  + ℎ) (2.11) 
ℎ =
( − )( − )
( −  −  + ℎ) (2.12) 
 =
 =
 =
 = 0 
 
Through these general expressions, we can evaluate how the mixed equilibrium 
expected utility of each player varies, when their respective utility payoffs change, 
analyzing the sign of the derivative. Before drawing some general conclusions, let us 
consider what happens in some classic games. 
 
Battle of the sexes game4: 
 
Based on Figure 7, the ordering of payoffs for this game is: a>d>c=b=0 and 
h>e>f=g=0. In this game there are two pure equilibria (X, W) and (Y, Z) and one mixed 
equilibrium. So, we have for player 1 (since the analysis is similar to player 2, it will be 
omitted): 
 
 =

( + ) > 0, 
 =
 =
2
( + ) > 0, 
 =

( + ) > 0. 
 
                                                        
4
 For a better understanding of the history of the Battle of the sexes game, see Luce and Raiffa (1989). 
In this game, we conclude that an increase in any of the utility payoffs also leads 
to an increase in the mixed equilibrium expected utility of its respective player. But 
does this always happen? That means, an increase in one of the utility payoffs always 
leads to an increasing of the mixed equilibrium expected utility of a given player? The 
next example shows that this is not true. 
 
The Stag-hunt game5: 
 
Based on Figure 7, the ordering of payoffs is: a>c>d>b=0 and e>f>h>g=0. In 
this game there are two pure equilibria (X, W) and (Y, Z) and one mixed equilibrium, but 
the pair (X, W) is payoff dominant6, i.e., it is Pareto efficient. Therefore, we have for 
player 1: 
 
 =
( − )
( −  + ) < 0, 
 =
( − )( − )
( −  + ) < 0, 
 =

( −  + ) > 0, 
 =
( − )
( −  + ) > 0. 
 
Now, a strange result emerges. In some cases, when the utility payoff of a given 
player increases, his mixed equilibrium expected utility decreases. For example7, when 
the utility payoff a (resp., e) increases, the mixed equilibrium expected utility of player 
1 (resp., 2) decreases, even the pair of strategies (X, W) being a Nash equilibrium. To 
highlight the problem, imagine the following case: suppose the utility payoffs a and e 
increase indefinitely, making a→∞ and e→∞, while the other payoffs remain constant. 
So, 0limlim ==
∞→∞→
pq
ea
 
and, consequently, players will converge to the equilibrium (Y, Z). 
Thus, when the utilities of the equilibrium (X, W) become extraordinarily higher than 
the other utility payoffs of the game, the mixed equilibrium strategy profile 
recommends the players to choose it with extremely low probability. It can be shown 
that positive variations in the highest and lowest utilities payoffs of each player, would 
lead to a reduction in their respective mixed equilibrium expected utility. But before 
discussing the causes of these results, it is appropriate to consider other examples, 
verifying the similarities between them. 
 
Games without pure equilibrium: 
 
Now, we analyze two games without pure equilibrium. In the first game, the 
ordering of payoffs is: d>a>c>b=0 and f>g>h>e=0. Thus, we have for player 1: 
 
 =
( − )
( −  + ) > 0, 
 =
( − )( − )
( −  + ) > 0, 
                                                        
5
 See Binmore (1994). 
6
 While (Y, Z) is risk dominant. For a complete discussion see Harsanyi and Selten (1988). 
7
 The reader is invited to test other cases when the payoffs tend to specific limits and check other 
strange results. 
 =

( −  + ) > 0, 
 =
( − )
( −  + ) > 0. 
 
In the second game, the ordering of payoffs is: a>c>d>b=0 and g>h>f>e=0. 
Thus, for player 1 we have: 
 
 =
( − )
( −  + ) < 0, 
 =
( − )( − )
( −  + ) < 0, 
 =

( −  + ) > 0, 
 =
( − )
( −  + ) > 0. 
 
Although in the first game all derivatives are positive, in the second game there 
are negative derivatives which are the ones taken with respect the highest and the lowest 
utility payoffs of the game. 
The chicken game: 
 
In our last example, the ordering of payoffs is: b>d>c>a=0, g>h>f>e=0. In this 
game, there are two pure equilibria (Y, W) and (X, Z) and one mixed equilibrium. Thus, 
we have for player 1: 
 
 =
( − )( − )
( −  − ) < 0, 
 =
( − )
( −  − ) < 0, 
 =
( − )
( −  − ) > 0, 
 =
)
( −  − ) > 0. 
 
In this game, we also have some negative derivatives. It is important to observe 
that, in all examples, whenever a negative derivative exists, it is when it is taken with 
respect to either the highest or the lowest payoff of the player. In the next section, we 
prove some necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of negative derivatives 
and we show that this result always occurs and it is not a mere coincidence of our 
examples. 
 
 
3. Analyzing the sign of the derivatives 
 
In this section, we discuss necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that 
the derivative of expected utility of a given player with respect to a given utility payoff 
is negative (or at least non-positive). Initially, we analyze the case of expected utility for 
a given pure equilibrium, as summarized in Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1: In any pure Nash equilibrium, the derivatives of the expected utilities of a 
given player with respect to his (or her) own payoffs are always non-negative. 
 
Proof: The proof of this Lemma is very simple and intuitive. Suppose that the strategy 
profile (si, sj) is a pure equilibrium of a given game, resulting in a utility Ui(si, sj) = x for 
player i. Therefore, the derivative of expected utility with respect to player i’s payoff is 
equal to one for any payoff equal to x, and is equal to zero for the other cases.□ 
 
This result indicates that, when we analyze a pure equilibrium (when there is at 
least one pure equilibrium in the game), an increase in some of the payoffs of any player 
will never reduce his expected utility in that pure equilibrium. Moreover, we can also 
ensure non-negative derivatives for the following cases, as summarized in Lemma 2. 
But before, let us make a definition. 
 
Definition 1: Let Γ = (K, (S ) ∈", (U ) ∈") be a two person game in strategic form and $% ≠ $̂% be two strategies in Si, then we say that si and $̂% are always indifferent for player ( ∈ ) if U *$% , s,- = U *$̂% , s,-, ∀ s, ∈ S,. 
 
Lemma 2: Based on Figure 7, if player i has a strongly or weakly dominant strategy or 
is always indifferent between his strategies then the derivatives of the mixed 
equilibrium expected utility of player i are non-negative. 
 
Proof: Without loss of generality, let us consider that i=1. First, let us analyze the case 
in which such player has a strongly dominant strategy, say strategy X.8 Let us consider 
the possible cases: (a) e>f , (b) f>e or (c) f=e. If e>f or f>e, then the game has a unique 
pure equilibrium, (X, W) or (X, Z), respectively, and as shown in Lemma 1, in any pure 
Nash equilibrium, the derivatives of the expected utility are non-negative. Thus, we 
must check only the case where e=f. If this condition occurs, then the game has two 
pure equilibria and infinitely many mixed equilibria, E = (M, N), where M = (1, 0) and 
N = (q*, 1-q*) for q*∈[0, 1]. Thus, the expected utility of player 1 would be: EU1 = 
aq* + b(1-q*) and consequently, the derivatives of the expected utility for the payoffs 
are also non-negative. Secondly, consider the case where X is a weakly dominant 
strategy (we already know from Lemma 1 that the derivatives of the expected utility of 
pure equilibrium are at least non-negative, so we will not analyze these cases anymore). 
Now we have two possible cases: (A) a=c and b>d or (B) a>c and b=d. In case (A), the 
mixed equilibrium expected utility of player 1 is EU1 =a=c; on the other hand, in case 
(B), the mixed equilibrium expected utility of player 1 is EU1=d=b. Therefore, it is easy 
to see that the derivatives are non-negative. Finally, we must examine the case in which 
the strategies X and Y are always indifferent for player 1, that is, when a=c and b=d. In 
this case, regardless of the mixed strategy chosen by player 2, the mixed equilibrium 
will result in an expected utility for player 1 equal to  =  −  + . Thus, the 
derivatives are non-negative.□ 
 
Returning to the analysis of the conditions that guarantee non-positive 
derivatives and strictly negative derivatives, we request the reader to re-examine the 
games discussed in the beginning of this Section. There, it can be seen that the negative 
derivatives occurred only in games in which players have a preference that the other 
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 We could also assume Y as the strongly dominant strategy.  
uses a particular strategy, regardless of his own choice. To make this idea more formal, 
consider the concept of collaborative dominance proposed by Souza and Rêgo (2010): 
 
Strong (or Strict) Collaborative Dominance: For game Γ, we say that strategy $/∗ ∊ 2/ 
is strongly collaboratively dominant with respect to strategy $/ ∊ 2/ for player i if %*$% , $/∗- > %*$% , $/-, ∀ $% ∈ 2%. 
 
Weak (or Non-Strict) Collaborative Dominance: For game Γ, we say that strategy $/∗ ∊ 2/ is weakly collaboratively dominant with respect to strategy $/ ∊ 2/ for player i if %*$% , $/∗- ≥ %*$% , $/-, ∀ $% ∈ 2% and, for at least one $̂% ∈ 2%, %*$̂% , $/∗- > %*$̂% , $/-. 
 
Theorems 1 and 2 show that a non-positive (respectively, negative) derivative of 
the mixed equilibrium expected utility of a given player i with respect to his own utility 
payoffs occurs if, and only if, player j has a strategy that is weakly (respectively, 
strongly) collaboratively dominant for him, player i. Moreover, non-positive 
(respectively, negative) derivatives always occur when are taken with respect to player 
i’s utility payoffs associated with the strategy that is the best response to the weakly 
(resp. strongly) collaboratively dominant strategy of player j (and those are the highest 
and lowest utility payoffs of player i).  
 
Theorem 1: Suppose that player i does not have a strongly or a weakly dominant 
strategy and is not always indifferent between his strategies. So there are two 
derivatives of the mixed equilibrium expected utility of player i taken with respect to 
player i’s utility payoffs that are non-positive and two that are positive if, and only if, 
player j has a weakly collaboratively dominant strategy for player i. Moreover, the non-
positive derivatives are always with respect to player i’s utility payoffs associated with 
the strategy that is the best response to the weakly collaboratively dominant strategy of 
player j (and those are the highest and lowest utility payoffs of player i). 
 
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that i=1. So, given the assumptions of the 
Theorem, there are two possibilities for partially ordering the payoffs of player 1, as 
follows: (A) a>c and b<d or (B) a<c and b>d. Let us consider case (A). It follows that 4567
48 ≤ 0 ↔  ≥ , 45674; ≤ 0 ↔  ≥ , 45674< ≤ 0 ↔  ≥  and 45674@ ≤ 0 ↔  ≥ , so we should 
consider the following three sub-cases: 
 
(A1) c≥d: In this case, a>c≥d>b and strategy W is weakly collaboratively dominant for 
player 1. Furthermore, strategy X of player 1 is the best response to W and ABC7
AD  and ABC7AE  are non-positive (a is the highest payoff and b is the lowest), while the 
other derivatives are positive. 
(A2) b≥a: In this case, d>b≥a>c, and strategy Z is weakly collaboratively dominant for 
player 1. Furthermore, strategy Y of player 1 is the best response to Z and 4567
4<  and 45674@  are non-positive (d is the highest payoff and c is the lowest), while the 
other derivatives are positive. 
(A3) d>c and a>b: In this case, there are no weakly collaboratively dominant strategies 
and all derivatives are positive. 
The proof of condition (B) is analogous and is left to the reader.□ 
 
Theorem 2: Suppose that player i does not have a strongly or a weakly dominant 
strategy and is not always indifferent between his strategies. So there are two 
derivatives of the mixed equilibrium expected utility of player i taken with respect to 
player i’s utility payoffs that are negative and two that are positive if, and only if, player 
j has a strongly collaboratively dominant strategy for player i. Moreover, the negative 
derivatives are always with respect to player i’s utility payoffs associated with the 
strategy that is the best response to the strongly collaboratively dominant strategy of 
player j (and those are the highest and lowest utility payoffs of player i). 
 
Proof: Following the same idea of the proof of Theorem 1, we have: (A) a>c b<d or 
(B) a<c and b>d. Suppose that we are in case (A). It follows that 456748 < 0 ↔  > ,4567
4; < 0 ↔  > , 45674< < 0 ↔  >   e  45674@ < 0 ↔  > . Therefore, consider the 
following three sub-cases: 
 
(A1) c>d: In this case, a>c>d>b and strategy W is strongly collaboratively dominant 
for player 1. Furthermore, strategy X of player 1 is the best response to W and 4567
48  and 45674;  are negative (a is the highest payoff and b is the lowest), while the other 
derivatives are positive. 
 (A2) b>a: In this case, d>b>a>c, and strategy Z is strongly collaboratively dominant 
for player 1. Furthermore, strategy Y of player 1 is the best response to Z and 
4567
4<  and 45674@  are negative (d is the highest payoff and c is the lowest), while the other 
derivatives are positive. 
(A3) d≥c and a≥b. In this case, there are no strongly collaboratively dominant strategies 
and all derivatives are non-negative. 
Again, the analysis of case (B) is analogous and is left to the reader.□ 
 
4. Burning money 
In the previous section, we showed that whenever negative derivatives happen, they are 
with respect to the highest and lowest payoffs of a given player. In this section, we 
answer the following question: assuming that players will play according to the mixed 
equilibrium, and there are two negative derivatives for a given player, if this player has 
the opportunity to burn x utility payoff units, then what is the best burning utility 
strategy that the player can adopt? We now prove that he should burn utility in the case 
that he uses a strategy that is a best response to the strategy of the other player that is 
strongly collaboratively dominant for him. However, as we show next, for some cases 
the player should only burn utility if the other player indeed chooses the strongly 
collaboratively dominant strategy for him (this situation corresponds to burning utility 
in his highest utility payoff in the game), while in other cases the opposite should 
happen (this situation corresponds to burning utility in his lowest utility payoff in the 
game). 
In order to show this, we should look initially at how the mixed equilibrium 
strategy of a given player reacts to changes in the payoffs of the other player. Therefore, 
for player 2 we have: 9 
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 The analysis for player 1 is similar and therefore will be omitted. 

 =
(1 − )
 =
( − )
( −  −  + ) (4.1) 

 =
(1 − )
 =
( − )
( −  −  + ) (4.2) 

 =
(1 − )
 =
( − )
( −  −  + ) (4.3) 

 =
(1 − )
 =
( − )
( −  −  + ) (4.4) 
  
Now, we can rewrite equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8), as shown in 
Equations (4.5), (4.6), (4.7), (4.8), respectively. From these latter equations, it can be 
seen that the derivative of the expected utility of player 1 is a function of the derivative 
of player 2’s mixed equilibrium strategy. 
 
 = ( − )

 (4.5) 
 = ( − )

 (4.6) 
 = ( − )

 (4.7) 
 = ( − )

 (4.8) 
 
Theorem 2 states that negative derivatives of the player 1’s mixed equilibrium 
expected utility taken with respect to his payoffs occur if, and only if, one of these four 
orderings of payoffs happens: (1) d>b>a>c; (2) a>c>d>b; (3) b>d>c>a; (4) 
c>a>b>d. Let us consider Case (1). 
 
Case 1: d>b>a>c. In this case, strategy Z of player 2 is strongly collaboratively 
dominant for player 1. Thus, it follows that the derivative of the expected utility of 
player 1 is negative with respect to payoffs d and c, and 4G4< and 
4G
4@ are positive, implying 
that a reduction in one of these payoffs also reduces the chance of player 2 choosing 
strategy W and therefore increases the chance of player 2 choosing strategy Z, which, in 
this case, is strongly collaboratively dominant for player 1. The analysis of the 
remaining cases is analogous. 
 
So, it is evident that the player 1 should reduce the utility payoff (burning utility) 
that makes the player 2 converge faster to the strategy that is strongly collaboratively 
dominant for him, player 1. To emphasize this conclusion, let us analyze the same 
problem from another perspective. Now imagine that the player 1 has x>0 units of 
utility to burn in any payoff. Then, assuming that the general ordering of payoffs in the 
game is maintained, with respect to what payoff should he burn these x units of utility? 
Suppose, for example, that we are in Case 1, where d>b>a>c, also suppose that 
player 1 decided to burn αx units of utility in c and (1 - α)x units in d, with α  [0,1]. 
The reader should realize that to maintain the order of the payoffs we must ensure that 
(1 - α)x≤d-b. Thus, we have that the expected utility of player 1:  
 
 = * − H(1 − α)- − ( − HJ) −  − ( − Hα) + * − H(1 − α)- (4.9) 
 
We want to find the value of α that maximizes the expected utility of player 1. 
Deriving EU1 with respect to α we have: 
 J =
H( − )(H +  +  −  − )
( −  −  +  − H + 2Hα)  (4.10) 
 
Based on Equation 4.10, it can be seen that the derivative is positive if 0<x<(d-
b)+(c-a), and the player should burn the x units in the lowest payoff, c. On the other 
hand, if d-b≥x>(d-b)+(c-a), then he should burn the x units in the highest payoff, d. If 
x=(d-b)+(c-a), then the derivative is equal to zero and, consequently, it does not make 
difference in what payoff to burn utility. Note also that for a small value of x, as 
expected, the conclusions are the same that we obtained with the analysis of the 
derivatives made above, that is, player 1 should burn utility with respect to c while 4G
4< > 4G4@, which is equivalent to d-b>a-c, or burn utility with respect to d in the other 
case. By a similar analysis, we can describe what should be player 1’s behavior in each 
of the four cases where he has incentive to burn money. Thus, suppose that player 1 can 
burn x units of utility: 
 
Case 1: d>b>a>c. If x<(d-b)+(c-a), then he should burn the x units of utility with 
respect to the payoff c, while if d-b≥x>(d-b)+(c-a), then he should  burn it in d. 
Case 2: a>c>d>b. If x<(a-c)+(b-d), then he should burn the x units of utility with 
respect to the payoff b, while if a-c≥x>(a-c)+(b-d), then he should  burn it in a. 
Case 3: b>d>c>a. If x<(b-d)+(a-c), then he should burn the x units of utility with 
respect to the payoff a, while if b-d≥x>(b-d)+(a-c), then he should  burn it in b. 
Case 4: c>a>b>d. If x<(c-a)+(d-b), then he should burn the x units of utility with 
respect to the payoff d, while if c-a>x>(c-a)+(d-b), then he should  burn it in c. 
 
Thus, if a player has small power and cannot burn a great amount of utility, then he 
should invest all his efforts in burning money when he plays the best response (Y) to the 
other player‟s strongly collaboratively dominant strategy (Z), but the other player does 
not play such strategy, which corresponds to his lowest utility payoff in the game. On 
the other hand, if the player has a greater power, he should invest all his efforts in 
burning money when he plays the best response (Y) to the other player‟s strongly 
collaboratively dominant strategy and the other player indeed plays such strategy (Z), 
which corresponds to his highest utility payoff in the game. 
Assume that the conditions of Theorem 2 are satisfied. It is interesting to point 
out that in games with no pure equilibria and where both players have a strongly 
collaboratively dominant strategy, if we measure the value of participating in the game 
by the expected utility of the mixed equilibrium, then we showed that the value of 
participating in the game decreases as the highest and lowest utility payoffs of a player 
increases. Additionally, once a player knows that a reduction in some of his payoffs 
increases his mixed equilibrium expected utility, he may be tempted to lie about his true 
utility and that can cause a serious problem for utility elicitation in strategic settings. 
In a recent research, Engelmann and Steiner (2007) developed a study that 
evaluated how the expected material payoff of a mixed equilibrium (for a given player) 
increases or decreases with the degree of risk aversion of this given player. For this 
purpose, the authors focused on 2x2 games with two pure equilibria and one mixed 
equilibrium, restricting their analysis to the mixed equilibrium10. As their main 
contribution, the authors identified conditions, with respect to the material payoffs, that 
guarantee that the expected material equilibrium payoff of a given player is an 
increasing function of his risk aversion degree, as summarized by the following 
propositions. 
 
Proposition 1 (ENGELMANN and STEINER, 2007, p.383-384): When, a>c>d>b or 
a>d>c>d, the equilibrium probability q that player 2 chooses strategy W increases in 
the degree of risk aversion of player 1. 
 
Proposition 2 (ENGELMANN and STEINER, 2007, p.385): In any mixed equilibrium 
of a 2x2 game, if a>c>d>b, then the expected material payoff of player 1 increases in 
his degree of risk aversion. 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Since a>c>d>b, then, based on 
Proposition 1, we kwon that the probability q that player 2 chooses strategy W increases 
in the degree of risk aversion of player 1. Since strategy W of player 2 is strongly 
collaboratively dominant for player 1, then player 1 will always benefit (in terms of 
material payoff) by any increase in q. For a formal proof, see Engelmann and Steiner 
(2007). The authors also admit that their approach does not allow them to make any 
conclusion about the expected utility, and that because a variation in risk preference will 
lead to a variation in the utility of each (or some) pure strategy profile, and depending 
on the aggregate change, the new expected utility can increase, decrease or remain 
unchanged. In our paper, we provide a new contribution in the sense that we do not deal 
with material payoffs. We discussed how variations in utility may increase the mixed 
equilibrium expected utility of a given player. 
 
 
5. Discussions 
Until this section, we restricted our analysis of mixed equilibrium and the 
problem of burning utility only to 2x2 games with a single mixed equilibrium. Now, we 
present numerical examples that help us understand the fundamental limitations that 
prevent us from extending the results already exposed to more general games. We begin 
the discussion by analyzing the game shown in Figure 8, for which the conclusions of 
Section 4 are still valid (with the appropriate adjustments). 
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 The authors also make some restriction on the payoffs to simplify the analysis: |a-b|>|c-d| and a-b>0, 
with sign(a-c)= sign(d-b) and sign(e-f)= sign(h-g).  
In this game we only have one mixed equilibrium ((1/3, 2/3), (1/3, 0, 2/3)) and 
its support is Kα, αL × Nβ, βOP. Moreover, the expected utility of the players are (13/3, 
17/3). Also note that in this game, the strategy β is strongly collaboratively dominant 
with respect to strategy βO for player 1 and, without consider β since it is outside the 
equilibrium support, the strategy α is strongly collaboratively dominant with respect to 
α, for player 2. So for this game, we can use the results of Theorem 2 which indicates, 
for example, that a reduction in utility U1(α, β) in two units would increase the 
expected utility of player 1 to 5 and a reduction of utility U2(α, β) in one unit would 
increase the expected utility of player 2 to 6, i.e., both players would like to burn utility 
if they could. 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 Q Q  QO  J (7, 3) (4, 7) (3, 5) J (5, 7) (6, 2) (4, 6) 
Figure 8 
However, in this particular case, the game has a unique mixed equilibrium, 
whose support is composed of two pure strategies of each player, making it similar to a 
2x2 game. Now, we analyze a game in which all three pure strategies of player 2 are in 
the equilibrium support, as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Player 1 
Player 2 
 Q Q  QO  J (8, 0) (3, 1) (2, 1) J (6, 1) (4, 0) (5, 0) 
Figure 9 
Before calculating the mixed equilibrium of this game, let us define some 
notation. Let R(J) be the probability of player 1 choosing J (hence R(J) = 1 −R(J) is the probability that he chooses J) and let R(Q) be the probability of player 2 
choosing Q and  R(Q) be the probability of choosing Q (indeed, R(QO) = 1 −R(Q) − R(Q)). Thus we can characterize the mixed equilibrium of this game as 
follows: S(½, ½), UR(Q), OVWX(Y7) , OX(Y7)V Z[, where R(Q) ∈ \O , OW]. Moreover, the 
expected utility of the mixed equilibrium for player 1 is given by  = ^X(Y7)_^ , and 
depending on the value of R(Q), it can vary in the range  ∈ \`O , aW ]. 
Now, consider the mixed equilibrium ((½, ½), (1/2, 1/4, 1/4). In this case, the 
expected utility of player 1 is 5.25. Note that in this game, the strategy Q of player 2 is 
strongly collaboratively dominant (with respect to all others of player 2) for player 1. 
Thus, we may be tempted to apply our previous results and think that player 1 could 
reduce, for example, his highest payoff to induce player 2 to choose Q more frequently. 
Suppose that player 1 reduces U1(J, Q) from 8 to 7. Then, we can characterize the 
mixed equilibrium of the new game as follows: S(½, ½), UR(Q), OV`X(Y7) , X(Y7)V Z[, 
where R(Q) ∈ \ , O`]. Indeed, player 1’s mixed equilibrium expected utility is  =bX(Y7)_^
 , and depending on the value of R(Q), it can vary in the range  ∈ \5, O` ]. In 
this case, is easy to see that player 2 may, for example, keep R(Q) equal to ½ (just 
changing the values of R(Q) and R(QO)). In such situation, player 1’s expected utility 
reduces to 5. Once player 2 has a range11 of values for which he can manipulate R(Q), 
in general, it is impossible to say how he will react to any change in payoffs made by 
player 1.  
Now consider a game with three players each one with two strategies, as shown 
in Figure 10. Admit that the payoff a from the strategy profile (J, Q, d) is a value 
between 6 and 9, a ∊ [6, 9]. Thus, this game has two pure equilibria, (J , Q , d) and (J, Q, d)  and one mixed equilibrium. 
 
   d     d 
 Q Q    Q Q  J (a, 8, 8) (5, 7, 5)   J (0, 3, 7) (1, 4, 6)  J (3, 5, 3) (6, 6, 1)   J (4, 1, 4) (2, 2, 2)  
Figure 10 
By making the payoff a vary between 6 and 9, we can analyze how the mixed 
equilibrium expected utility of player 1 reacts. In particular, we are interested if the 
expected utility is a increasing or a decreasing function of a. The expected utility of 
player 1 is given by Equation 5.1; additionally, Figure 11 shows the mixed equilibrium 
expected utility of player 1 when a varies from 6 to 9.  
 
 = ( − 4) j3 + √13 + 42 + 2 m

+ 3 j3 + √13 + 42 + 2 m + 1 (5.1) 
 
 
Figure 11 
 
So for any value of a higher than 6.9 (approximately) and lower then 9, a 
reduction in a will lead to an increase in the expected utility of player 1. On the other 
hand, for any value of a lower than 6.9 (approximately) and higher than 6, a reduction 
in a will also lead to a reduction in the mixed equilibrium expected utility of player 1. 
Furthermore, if we assume that, initially, a is equal 6, any reduction in any payoff of 
player 1 will also lead to a reduction in his expected utility. But if, for example, we 
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 There are an intersection between the two cases, R(Q) ∈ \ , OW]. 
assume a initial value of 8, a small reduction in any payoff of player 1 related to the 
pure strategy J, will lead an increase of player’s 1 mixed equilibrium expected utility, 
even neither of the players (2 nor 3) having a strategy that is collaboratively dominant 
for player 1. Consequently, in more general class of games, the existence of negative 
derivatives does not depend of the existence of collaboratively dominant strategies. 
Moreover, since a is always the highest payoff of player 1, the existence of negative 
derivatives does not depend only on the order of the payoffs.  
 Additionaly, based on Figure 10, supposes that the payoff of player 2 from the 
strategy profile (J, Q, d) was reduced from 6 to 4, and a is equal to 8, as shown in 
Figure 12. 
 
   d     d 
 Q Q    Q Q  J (8, 8, 8) (5, 7, 5)   J (0, 3, 7) (1, 4, 6)  J (3, 5, 3) (6, 4, 1)   J (4, 1, 4) (2, 2, 2)  
Figure 12 
This new game also has two pure equilibria, (J, Q, d) and (J, Q, d) and one 
mixed equilibrium, ((3/4; 1/4), (2/3; 1/3); (1/2, 1/2)). However, in this new game, when 
we make a small reduction in any payoff of player 1, then the expected utility from the 
mixed equilibrium also reduces. This example shows us that in a more general class of 
games, the existence of negative derivatives of the expected utility of a given player 
with respect to one of his payoff does not depend only of his own payoffs, as was the 
case in the 2x2 games. So, these facts prevent us to make extensions of Theorems 1 and 
2 to a more general class of games.  
 
 
6. An application: The Security dilemma 
Aumann (1990) proposed a discussion on when a Nash equilibrium can be 
considered self-enforcing based on a verbal agreement among players, i.e. how we can 
ensure that players will choose a given Nash equilibrium since they announced that they 
will. To develop his argument, Aumann uses as his main example the stag-hunt game. A 
numerical example of this game is shown in Figure 3. 
For the author, there are two ways to encourage a player to perform a given 
choice. The first one is related to a change in the information available to the player and 
the second one is related to a change in payoffs. Aumann decided to dedicate his 
analysis to the first case. Thus, based on the stag-hunt game, he concludes that even if 
the players claim that they will play (X, W) it does not increase the incentive of them 
actually choose those respective strategies. For example, when player 1 declares that he 
will play X, it does not add any information to player 2, because, since W is a strongly 
collaboratively dominant strategy for player 1, player 2 knows that player 1 prefers that 
he (player 2) plays W. Thus, player 2 knows that player 1 would state that consents to 
any agreement in which player 2 plays W, but this fact does not guarantee that the 
player 1 will really fulfill the agreement and play X. For example, player 1 may prefer to 
play Y, since this is a safer option. Similar reasoning also applies to player 2. 
Now, we discuss an application of our results by exploiting the gap left by 
Aumann (1990), i.e., we evaluate how to encourage players to make a given choice 
based on changes on the payoffs. For this, we also illustrate our argumentation with the 
stag-hunt game which is also known as the security dilemma due to the work of Jervis 
(1978). Furthermore, we will critically analyze some passages from the work of Jervis, 
revisiting the author's conclusions with a game theoretic perspective. 
To summarize the main idea of the security dilemma, imagine two nations that 
go through a period of international tension. They have two strategic options, namely: 
do not make investment in weapons (cooperate, C) or perform military investment (non-
cooperate, D - defecting)12. The order of preferences for the possible strategies profiles 
are equivalent to stag-hunt game, as stated before. However, Jervis (1978) states that 
nations will only cooperate if they believe that the other will too and points out some 
possible explanations for the players to sacrifice the most desired option (CC), namely: 
the fear of being attacked and not be able to defend itself, political uncertainty in the 
neighboring nations and even coercion opportunities and participation in international 
affairs because of the military power (reputation). 
Jervis starts to study what could make mutual cooperation more likely by listing 
a set of conditions. For the author, the chance of achieving cooperation would increase 
by:  
 
“(1) anything that increases incentives to cooperate by increasing the gains of 
mutual cooperation (CC) and/or decreasing the cost the actor will pay if he 
cooperates and the other does not (CD); (2) anything that decreases the 
incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of taking advantage of the 
other (DC) and/or increasing the cost of mutual noncooperation (DD); (3) 
anything that increases each side’s expectation that other will cooperate.” 
(JERVIS, 1978, p. 171). 
We will now evaluate the effects of these affirmations, especially regarding 
conditions (1) and (2). The idea of 'what makes cooperation more likely' can raise 
various interpretations, e.g., we may think about the concept of equilibrium selection or 
focal point, but to apply these concepts, it is not necessary to make any changes in 
payoffs, i.e., if the players were determined to apply any equilibrium selection criterion 
(or identify a focal point), then a change in payoffs should not alter the original 
decision, except that the change in payoffs is such that modify the original equilibrium 
set of the game. Therefore, we must analyze ‘what makes cooperation more likely' from 
the perspective of the mixed equilibrium. 
In Section 3, Figure 7, we saw that the order of the payoffs for the Stag-hunt 
game (security dilemma) is a>c>d>b (for player 1) and e>f>h>g (for player 2). Thus, 
by condition (1) Jervis suggests that cooperation would be more likely if the players 
were able to increase the payoffs a and e or if they were able to increase the payoffs b 
and g. However, by Case 2 in Section 5, we saw that 4G48 and 
4G
4; are negative (the same 
holds for 4n4o  and 
4n
4p) and, thereby, any increase in these payoffs, in fact, would make 
cooperation less likely. In turn, condition (2) states that cooperation would be more 
likely to occur if the players would reduce the payoffs c and f or reduce the payoffs d 
and h: but, since 4G4< and 
4G
4@ are positive, the effect is reversed and cooperation, again, 
would be less likely. In particular, by condition (2), the cooperation would only become 
more likely if, for example, the reduction in payoffs d and h were of such intensity that 
turn them in the lowest payoff of the game and, consequently, the new game will have a 
unique Nash equilibrium (CC). 
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 In our early version of the stag-hunt game, cooperation is represented by the strategies X and W, and 
non-cooperation is represented by strategies Y and Z.   
Later in his study, Jervis discusses what a player (nation) should do to increase 
the likelihood that the other player will cooperate, stating: 
 
“The variables discussed so far influence the payoff for each of the four 
possible outcomes. To decide what to do, the state has to go further and 
calculate the expected value of cooperating or defecting. Because such 
calculations involve estimating the probability that the other will cooperate, 
the state will have to judge how the variables discussed so far act on the 
other. To encourage the other to cooperate, a state may try to manipulate 
these variables. It can lower the other’s incentives to defect by decreasing 
what it could gain by exploiting the state (DC)…” (JERVIS, 1978, p. 179). 
The author follows his argument by pointing another example: 
 
“The state can also try to increase the gains that will accrue to the other from 
mutual cooperation (CC). Although the state will of course gain if it receives 
a share of any new benefits, even an increment that accrues entirely to the 
other will aid the state by increasing the likelihood that the other will 
cooperate.” (JERVIS, 1978, p. 180). 
 
Again, we must focus on players’ mixed strategies. As it was shown in Section 
2, the mixed equilibrium strategy of a given player depends only on the utility payoffs 
of the other player. Thus, increasing the utility payoff from mutual cooperation of a 
given player does not change the mixed equilibrium strategy of such player. In fact, 
what happens is a change in the mixed equilibrium strategy of the other player, which 
will now choose to cooperate less likely, as opposed to what was expected by Jervis. 
We recognize that the problems of international cooperation are far more 
complex than as exposed above, because they involve aspects of reputation and long-
term relationship, for example. However, we hope that our approach can contribute to 
the better understanding of some aspects of the problem. 
 
 
7. Final remarks 
In this paper we propose a new approach to analyze burning money behavior 
through the analysis of the mixed Nash equilibrium in normal form games. We provide 
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of negative derivatives of the 
expected utility that justify burning money behavior. Furthermore, we use our insights 
to analyze the security dilemma revisiting some conclusions made by Jervis (1978).    
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